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and environmental sustainability. ‘Ocean space’ andmobilities are constructed through normative considerations
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Functionalism involves mechanisms for international collaboration
through organisations with designated speciﬁc tasks that evolve as
functional needs change. The system incorporates the premise of peace-
ful co-operation and the outcome of a pluralist international community
where national control is marginalised through functional linkages and
rationality. ‘Cooperation for the common good is the task, both for the
sake of peace and of a better life, and for that it is essential that certain
interests and activities should be taken out of competition and worked
together’ (Mitrany, 1975b: p112). Effectively, even though a normative
perspective exists functionalism involves a process of political
internationalisation where regulatory decisions are carried out at the
most rational or functional level. Mitrany (1975a) considered the conti-
nent as the ‘logical limit of coordination for rail transport (whereas)
shipping would be administered in inter-continental terms, while tele-
communications, broadcasting and air travel would be organised on an
international scale’ (p116). Indeed, the ‘line of effective organisation
(for shipping) … at once suggests itself as international, or inter-
continental, but not universal. A European union could not solve the
problem of maritime coordination without the cooperation of America
and… certain other overseas states’ (1975b: p107). This perspective ad-
vocates a quasi-internationalisation for shipping and this paper investi-
gates the situation regarding the industry following developments in
globalization and the European Union (EU). Through a study of shipping
and the social construction of ‘ocean space’ this paper explores the extent
that functional regulation or jurisdiction has been implemented and howthis may inform developments in regulatory formation and implementa-
tion in other functional areas affected by global variables.
Steinberg (2001) understood ‘ocean space’ as a social construction
and considered that human conceptualisations of this space were cen-
tral to ‘the institutions and structures that govern their lives’ (p191).
Whether or not we are conscious of this process, conceptualisations of
the ‘ocean space’ inﬂuence our socio-economic existence. Steinberg
(2001) identiﬁed that it was necessary for oceans to be recognised as
distinct social spaces. ‘Ocean spaces’ are perceived as ‘resource pro-
viders’ ‘battlegrounds’ and ‘transport surface’. Indeed, the formation
and regulation of ‘ocean space’ is normally premised on realist ideas
that identify the nation-state as the repository ‘of order and interna-
tional relations … characterized by archaic competition’ (Steinberg,
2001: p17). In similar contexts mobilities theorists consider that trans-
portation incorporates more than technological issues, but forms and
‘forces the structuring of political and social life’ (Cidell and Pryterch,
2015: p26).With a similar objective to transportation geographymobil-
ities emphasise the underlyingmeanings relating to disputed transpor-
tation issues. Rather than concentrate on infrastructures, mobilities
attend to ‘political cultural and aesthetic implications and resonance
ofmovements’… themeanings ascribed to themovements and the em-
bodied experience of mobilities (Cresswell and Merriman, 2011: p11).
This study concentrates on the wider political institutions that govern
movement and political interrelationships as well as regulatory struc-
ture and implementation.
With reference to ‘ocean space’ as social construction this paper dis-
tinguishes between ‘functional jurisdiction’ and ‘territorial jurisdiction’
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speciﬁcally regulation for shipping (Johnson, 1988: p8). Overall, we
conclude that although the proﬁt motive provides the driver for effec-
tive regulation functional international mechanisms enables effective
regulation for shipping in one speciﬁc sector ‘oil’. Fundamentally,
ocean space and mobilities are constructed through normative consid-
erations that rely on agencies beyond the nation-state and implementa-
tion of regulation through functional variables.
2. Functionalism: international and intercontinental approaches
Notions regarding functional jurisdiction can be found in thework of
David Mitrany (1943, 1975a, 1975b, 1975c) where he concentrated on
international institutions and perceived their existence as means by
which international boundaries may be overlaid by inter-state agencies
through which interests would gradually be integrated and interna-
tional peace realised. There exists a normative perspective relating to
peaceful co-existence that may be realised through functional regula-
tion. Indeed, functionalismengenders internationalwelfarewhichover-
comes emotional attachment to the nation-state. Effectively,
administration should be undertaken at the most logical level and en-
able efﬁcient decision making. Organisational networks should be de-
signed to meet a speciﬁc social, economic or technical objective.
Functionalism provides change through ‘linking authority to a speciﬁc
activity and seeks to break away from the traditional link between an
authority and a deﬁnitive territory’ (Mitrany, 1975a: p125) as well as
‘overcome the deep-seated division between the needs of material
unity and stubborn national loyalties’ (Mitrany, 1975a: p126).
In practice, functionalism is initiated at the intergovernmental or
continental level either privately or through the initiatives of
state(s) or supranational institutions. Industries with global reach and
governments that are unable to dealwith international business regula-
tions single-handedly create functional organisations which incorpo-
rate international administrative institutions. Whether initiated by the
state or supranational level the main impetus of organisational regula-
tion is ‘technical self-determination’. This incorporates the increasing
autonomy of technical organisations in that ‘administrative conve-
nience and efﬁciency demand that an expert body is not unduly ham-
pered in its investigations by the necessity of constantly new
instructions and authorisations’ or as Mitrany put it ‘certain agencies
are born with or achieve “functional autonomy” by virtue of the desir-
ability of such an autonomous status’ (cited in Sewell, 1966: p250–
51). Functional ‘needs’ in the expression of ‘demands’ from social
groups indicate social and structural goals and means by which these
objectives may be realised; these objectives are adhered to by govern-
ments and experts, and emphasise common needs rather than individ-
ual power. In short, functionalism is about building communities
through collective education, technocratic management and regulating
beyond the conﬁnes of a nation-state.
In response to increasing cross border trade and economic activities
involving a wider region this section examines evidence of functionalist
approaches using regional institutions. The best example incorporates
economic activity in Europe since the creation of the Single European
Market (SEM). The SEMpropelled individualmember states to compro-
mise regulatory activities (Non-Tariff Barriers) to facilitate cross border
trade. Through businesses interacting with the regulatory institutions
within the European Union (EU) competition gives way to greater co-
operation.
Haas (1958) identiﬁed this process as neo-functionalism in which
regulatory control transferred to new political community; this in-
volved a variant of functionalism where sub-national actors ‘in several
distinct national settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expecta-
tions and political activities toward a new centre, whose institutions
possess or demand jurisdiction over the pre-existing national states’
(1958: p16). Fundamentally, sub-national interests shift their allegiance
to a supranational institution. The ‘establishment of supranationalinstitutions designed to deal with functionally speciﬁc tasks set in mo-
tion economic, social and political processes which generate pressures
towards further integration’ (Tranholm-Mikkelson, 1991: p4). Through
European integration and Europeanization a newpolitical community is
established that involves member states, EU institutions and sub-
national actors developing regulatory structures. Indeed, with an appre-
ciation of these theoretical perspectives regarding regulatory formation
and implementation beyond the conventional state-based command
and control in the next section we turn to the regulatory practices in
the shipping industry with an emphasis on the tanker sector.3. Regulating ocean space: the shipping industry and tanker sector
Until the turn of the 20th century the regulation of ocean space
largely depended on individual states and initiatives of professional
bodies to counter marine insurance claims (Boisson, 1999). However,
the international nature of maritime business obliged the sector to
look beyond individual state regulations and consider harmonisation
at the global level. Common regulations on navigation signals and pro-
cedures on rescue in the high seas were early examples of international
efforts to bring consistency to maritime regulation. The 1914 interna-
tional conference on safety of life at sea (an aftermath of the sinking of
the Titanic) and the formation of the Inter-GovernmentalMaritimeCon-
sultative Organisation in 1948 under United Nations (which since 1982
has been known as the International Maritime Organisation (IMO))
were major milestones in the development an international regulatory
system. Indeed, the IMO stands as a prime example of where maritime
nation states came together to seek a form of functional integration
(see Gold, 1981 on the development of maritime regulation). Through
the IMO, at least at the formation stage, regulatory functional unity
can be perceived. However, responsibility for implementing and moni-
toring regulation is undertaken through individual nation-states
(known in the industry as the ﬂag states). This fails to conform to a
pure functionalist perspective, which calls for linking authority to a spe-
ciﬁc activity without having to depend on the traditional role of the na-
tion states. In this way, (until around 1960s) maritime regulation was
based on the premise of functionalism but relied on state-based agen-
cies for compliance rather than on inter-continental institutions.
The shipping industry provides a particularly illuminating critical
case of globalization and experiences regulatory initiatives of different
forms (Sampson and Bloor, 2007). Indeed, the discussion regarding
functionalism is timely as state regulatory authorities are faced with
considerable challenges in the wake of globalization and growing
internationalisation of business activities (Giddens, 1999; Habermas,
2006; Hay and Marsh, 2000; Held et al., 1999). Current debates suggest
an acceptance of a more pluralistic form of regulation which includes
the functionalist perspective at the supranational, regional and/or global
level (Habermas, 2006: p73). Questions need to be addressed regarding
mechanisms for developing the regulation of ‘ocean space’ and relation-
ships with the shipping industry. Indeed, in this context what form of
regulation does the shipping industry develop? Does it reﬂect a form
of functionalism and if so does a normative element exist? Furthermore,
does the industry reﬂect a pure form of functionalism and to what ex-
tent does a state-centric level persist? Is it more accurate to explain reg-
ulatory development and deployment as a form of neo-functionalism?
In the following sections of the paper we attempt to deal with these
questions through investigating the workings of two forms of function-
alism in the maritime tanker sector of the international shipping indus-
try, one originated through principles involving the international
dimension and the other using mechanism at the supranational level.
A study of regulation formation in a distinct industry can provide an in-
dication of how we may respond to developments of ‘ocean space’ and
mobilities in a globalized world at the international and supranational
levels and overcome deﬁciencies and limitations with territorial
jurisdiction.
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In this section we identify and outline the notion of regulation and
position of theRegulation School in relation to issues regardingperspec-
tives of globalization. Regulation may be considered as ‘a politico-
economic concept and, as such, can best be understood by reference
to different systems of economic organisation and the legal forms
which maintain them’ (Majone, 1990: p1–2). Regulation is an attempt
to correct market failure in the form of ‘monopoly power, negative ex-
ternalities, failures of information, or insufﬁcient provision of public
goods such as law and order or environmental protection’ (Majone,
1996: p263). Regulation is ‘justiﬁed’ in so far as it is needed to overcome
one or more market ‘defects’ that might otherwise prevent purely free
markets from serving the public interest. Regulation is the sustained
and focused control exercised by a public agency over activities that
are socially valued (Selznick, 1985). Furthermore, ‘market activities
can be regulated only in societies that consider such activities worth-
while in themselves and hence in need of protection as well as control’
(ibid). Industrial societies generally accentuate a tension between two
systems of economic organisation: themarket system and the collectiv-
ist system. The former is where individuals and sectors are allowed to
function with minimal interference in the pursuit of their own goals,
whereas the latter looks to control and direct behaviour through
intervention.
The Regulation School has been inﬂuenced by structural Marxism
and identiﬁes economic and social forms that display tensions in
existing relations; the school is interested in capital accumulation and
how this can be regulated or stabilized through regulatory structures
(Aglietta, 1976). Marx and Engels propagated that the economic base
or social structures rather that political superstructures or ideological
consciousness provide the main means for explaining social transfor-
mation. Structural Marxism argued that through deploying regulation
the state functions in the long term interest of capitalism and incorpo-
rates an entity that regulates class conﬂict. Structural change could be
perceived through historical materialism aswell as critical realist ontol-
ogy and epistemology regarding modes of production and transforma-
tion through structured causality. Through regulation the state
manages capitalism and may be perceived as a ‘potential resource or
threat to every industry in society.With its power to prohibit or compel,
to take or givemoney the state does selectively help or hurt a vast num-
ber of industries’ (Stigler, 1971: p3).
An approachwithin the regulation school involves concernswith in-
ternational societalization which has drawn on realist and functional
perspectives to explore attempts to develop and establish international
regimes and global order. ‘The expansion of the European Union, other
forms of macro-regionalism and growing recognition of the importance
of globalization have prompted more general interest in international
societalization’ (Jessop and Sum, 2006: p30). International
societalization identiﬁes similarities or ‘complementarities between
emerging international structures and strategies to establish a (regu-
lated) global order through international regimes’ (ibid). However,
neo-liberal perspectives claim that unregulated global free-trade will
lead to a general improvement in standards of living; neo-liberal propo-
nents consider that the state should be subordinate to the market and
through globalization and free trade all will beneﬁt. ‘The more open
an economy is to trade, the faster it can catch up with developed coun-
tries. And poor people within developing countries will beneﬁt most
from trade liberalisation’ (Coyle, 2000). However, the opening of trade
and ﬁnancial markets withminimal regulation has resulted in a skewed
impact which has beneﬁtted investors and relatively richer countries at
the cost of the economically weak and the poorer states. Among critics
there exists an anti-globalization feeling that proposes ‘a coalition
based on resistance to the social decline of the actual or potential losers
of structural change and the disempowerment of the democratic state
and its citizens’ (Habermas, 2006: p81). Consequently, some form of
regulation is required to offset the problems that emerge through anunregulated global market for ﬁnance, business and (for this study)
more speciﬁcally shipping e.g. environmental disasters and issues re-
garding labour, safety and expertise.
Deregulation (or re-regulation) in the recent period of globalization
has taken different forms and has affected most sectors and industries
especially those spanning national borders. Indeed, one can identify a
shift from an orthodox state-led command and control form of regula-
tion toward a more pluralistic structure where different types of non-
state players intervene at different levels (Gunningham and Rees,
1997; Sinclair, 1997; Gunningham and Grabosky, 1998; Gunningham,
1998; Gunningham and Sinclair, 1999; van Erp and Huisman, 2010).
Such an approach may be identiﬁed as a form of international
societalization when understanding the development of regulatory
structures. Gibbs et al. (2010) highlighted the importance of taking a
‘responsive’ approach to regulation which implies state regulation
with greater ﬂexibility and strategic intervention. In a similar way,
Gunningham (2007) suggests the need for greater self-regulation
using, for example, the Safety Case Approach (SCA)where organisations
are required to operatewithin state approvedmonitored self-regulatory
procedures. Likewise, Braithwaite and Drahos (2000) argued for a regu-
latory concept based on ‘network regulation’ in which multiple regula-
tory players are all kept in check by one another. In addition, Siems and
Schinder (2014) revisited the concept of ‘ordoliberalism’ which identi-
ﬁed the need for state intervention to maintain order even in economic
liberalism. In a slightly different format, Gerefﬁ et al. (2005) underlined
the growing evidence of regulatory control exerted by supply chain
leaders and the impact on workplace health and safety in an increas-
ingly market-led business world. (Walters and James, 2009) Drawing
on arguments relating to global regulation, international societalization
and functionalist approaches this paper assesses issues regarding regu-
lation and construction of ocean space through a study of the maritime
industry.
5. Regulating the international maritime industry: international of
inter-continental?
Due to the progressive increase of global free-market, over the last
four decades, ship-owners have increasingly chosen to register their
ships in countries, such as Liberia, Panama, and Bahamas, commonly
known as the Flags of Convenience (FOC) (Ozcayir, 2001). The transfer
of assets to FOCs provides a twofold beneﬁt for ship-owners. First, a
FOC registered ship enjoys little regulatory oversight from the state,
which allows cost efﬁciencies in terms of low registration fees and
maintenance expenses. Second, minimal requirements on the labour
standards of FOC also allow ship-owners to employ relatively low-
wage seafarers from Eastern Europe, East and South East Asia based
on relatively poor employment contracts and working conditions (ILO,
2001).
Since the freemarket allows ship-owners to choose the ‘appropriate’
register there is new competition in the business of ship registration
among the FOC states as they are keen to acquire more ships for com-
mercial gain through imposing limited regulatory pressure (Alderton
and Winchester, 2002). As a consequence of FOCs a number of regula-
tory initiatives were initiated to mitigate the fallout of ﬂagging out.
Among them the Port State Control (PSC) regulation (adopted in
1982) made considerable impact. It gave legislative rights for states to
inspect shipboard operational practices and statutory certiﬁcates on for-
eign registered ships which docked in its ports. The ﬁrst and widely ac-
knowledged as the most effective region for PSC was Europe; this is an
intercontinental/international institution (instituted through the Paris
Memorandum of Understanding MoU), which provided the structure
for shipping regulation development at the European level. The potency
of PSC emits from its power to detain ships when deﬁciencies identiﬁed
during inspections endangered their safety and could result in accidents
or oil pollution (Ozcayir, 2001). The PSC also derived strength and cred-
ibility throughmaking inspection results publicly available, categorising
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with the inspected ships.
Implementation of regulation in the industry followed a structured
system under the IMO (as noted above a specialised UNAgency) and in-
volved deliberation between delegates who are mainly representatives
of Flag States. Consensus is reached regarding the adoption of interna-
tionally agreed regulations and subsequent implementation is moni-
tored by each Flag State (Boisson, 1999). As the process does not
involve ship owners thedevelopment of the PSC, like other pieces of leg-
islation, did not provide an opportunity to the ship owners to object to
the new regime. For the relatively unscrupulous ship owners PSC con-
tinues to be seen as a deterrent and over the last three decades there
has been considerable interest in enhancing its inspection and control
mechanisms from both practitioners (Lowry, 2007) and academics
(Heija et al., 2011; Fan et al., 2014).
Indeed, the PSC was coordinated through a regional (continental)
approach and institutionalised in Europe. The embryonic PSC took
form in 1978 when eight nations from North West European came to-
gether through the Hague Memorandum to enforce shipboard living
and working conditions as identiﬁed by the ILO Convention no. 147.
While the HagueMemorandumwas being formalised, serious oil pollu-
tion from Amoco Cadiz disaster resulted in outcry from the public which
inﬂuenced politicians from European States together with representa-
tives from the European Commission to include wider safety features
for shipping. This disaster was seen as a representation of the declining
standards of regulatory compliance brought about through FOCs and
the response a call for regulatory control at the supranational level
based on an emerging normative perspective in the form of environ-
mentalism (Ozcayir, 2001; Grey, 1996, 2007; Paris, 2012). Onemay con-
sider that in this context we can observe the relationship between
functional and state organisations.
The realisation of the Paris MoU identiﬁed inter-continental and in-
ternational dimensions and was facilitated by the political reshaping of
Europe. The beneﬁts of the PSC have been widely acknowledged and
regularly reported in the maritime media (Cariou et al., 2008) which
suggests that this functional approach to regulation (at least in the
European context) was highly effective. Through regional co-
operation the MoU has continued to expand and now involves most of
the European coastal states. Indeed, following the continued develop-
ment of the MoU over recent years similar regional groupings have
emerged in other parts of the world.
During the same period the tanker sector and major oil companies
made independent provisions for addressing concerns surrounding oil
pollution from sea transportation. The tarnished image of the tanker
sector has in the aftermath of ﬂagging out shown remarkable improve-
ment, largely credited to the role played by oil majors in inspecting and
controlling the maritime tanker industry (ITOPF, 2012; Brown, 2013).
Big oil companies, such as Shell, Texaco and Exxon commonly re-
ferred to as oilmajors dominate the business. As oilmajors are relatively
few in number, they enjoy an oligopolistic position in this trade and
thus as major clients of oil tanker owners they are able to apply pres-
sures to the outsourced linkages to comply. Because trading oil major
cargo yielded higher than average market rate of ship-hire (charter),
they were able to exploit the economic imbalance in the business.
In 1970 the oil majors formed the Oil Company International Marine
Forum (OCIMF) as a response to increasing public awareness of marine
pollution and as an immediate response to the major pollution disaster
caused by the tanker Torrey Canyon. The purpose was to provide opera-
tional advice and guidelines. In 1993 it was extended to include a safety
initiative speciﬁcally designed to address concerns about sub-standard
tanker operation and maintenance; the Ship Inspection Report Pro-
gramme (SIRE). This programme involves tanker vetting using a uni-
form inspection protocol by accredited SIRE inspectors and an
inspection report database accessible to OCIMF members and other cli-
ents of oil tankers. To ensure that the shipping companies involved in
their business maintain high operating and safety standards, oil majorsuse the SIRE reports to determine the suitability of both the ship and
management practice before companies were employment (OCIMF,
2013).
Such regulatory arrangements are embedded in the functionalist ar-
gument. As the central economic authority in this trade, the oil majors
are arguably themost rational players in monitoring and enforcing reg-
ulatory functions that supplemented the state processes in the tanker
sector of the maritime industry (Mitchell, 1994). Although they were
not seen as a substitute to the state based regulatory structure in the in-
dustry, it is no coincidence that they came into prominence during the
same period that witnessed a general decline in state-based maritime
regulation.
Both of these regulatory institutions do not have rule making capac-
ity and are supplementary to the state based systemwithin a hybridized
global shipping regulatory regime. The PSC is an institution that was
created out of necessity to provide support for the ﬂag states by
inspecting the ships on their behalf. As a large number of ships call at
the ports of their own FOC states less frequently (if at all) than the
more popular trading ports which also apply rigorous PSC regime
(such as the Paris MoU) the PSC acts as a surrogate regulator. In the
case of oil majors, the conceptual basis of their role is even further re-
moved from that of the ﬂag states. In fact elsewhere Bhattacharya and
Tang (2013) have argued that oil majors cannot substitute the role
states (should) play.
In this sense PSC and oilmajors are not alone; an intricate network of
regulators, such as classiﬁcation societies, insurance companies and
ship builders are among the regulating inﬂuences that contribute to
and supplement the role of the ﬂag states (Furger, 1997; Mitchell,
1994). DeSombre (2006) pointed out how these inﬂuences played a
major role in encouraging FOCs to raise their levels of regulatory com-
pliance. Instead of spiralling down to a self-destructing race to the bot-
tom, these supplementary inﬂuences helped maintain a great degree of
stability in the industry even after the exodus of ship owners to FOCs. In
fact it would be prudent to admit that oil majors were able to make use
of and build on the existing platform held together by the state/non-
state based actors and raise regulatory inspection and control. Never-
theless, this does not take anything away from the oil majors' regulatory
initiative which demonstrates how dedicated functional regulatory ini-
tiatives can be highly effective.
It is our intention to analyse how the impacts of two similar yet dif-
ferent regulatory sources (based in functionalism) underpin regulation
formation in the shipping industry and help understand the theoretical
perspectives regarding formation and implementation of regulation be-
yond the nation-state. The data sources determine the impacts of the
regulations are drawn from those who are regulated, i.e. directors, sea-
farers andmanager, details of whichwe discuss further in the following
section.
6. Methodology & methods
In this sectionwe explain how the study developed an ethnographic
constructivist methodology and the extent our approach perceives
human understanding as incorporating objective, subjective and rela-
tive perspectives. ‘Ethnographic studies … provide social scientiﬁc de-
scriptions of people and their cultural bases; in such a way we can
develop comprehensions of ‘self’ in relation to ‘other’ in terms of becom-
ing’ (Howell, 2013: p129). A constructivist ethnographic study develops
an integrated synthesis of theory and practice. Indeed, the ‘ﬁnal inter-
pretative theory is multi-voiced and dialogical. It builds on native inter-
pretations and articulates what is implicit in those interpretations’
(Denzin and Lincoln, 1994: p120). Constructivist ethnography provides
a means of understanding the experiences, beliefs and behaviours of
those involved in speciﬁc situations. We concentrate on the perspective
of those involved in the application of regulation and their deﬁnition of
‘good’. Through ‘thick description and interpretation’wedevelop an un-
derstanding of human existence and social science perspectives at the
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is difﬁcult to draw on all perspectives and such a concentration can
omit certain interpretations and variables. Consequently, the study
failed to interview inspectors but included secondary data regarding in-
spection rates, outcomes and safety records.
With the application of thismethodology the study conducted inter-
views between 2006 and 2010,which aimed to develop an in-depth un-
derstanding (thick description and interpretation) of the regulatory
practice in the maritime tanker industry in its natural context. It in-
volved two oil tanker companies, one trading internationally (WorldCo)
and the other in Europeanwaters (EuroCo). The companies had approx-
imately 15 ships in each ﬂeet and nearly all were trading oil major
cargoes and regularly calling at ports in Europe. As a result they were
routinely subjected to PSC inspections and control led by the Paris
MoU and oil majors. The ﬂag states of the ships in both companies in-
cluded TMN aswell as FOC. The proﬁles of the two companies had noth-
ing to suggest that either of them had any feature that was atypical of
the maritime tanker industry (see Stake, 2000 for further). The identi-
ties of the companies and individuals interviewed are intentionally
kept vague due to conﬁdentiality agreements.
The ﬁrst phase of data was collected in the companies' shore-based
technical management ofﬁces located in two different cities in Europe.
Here a total of 20 management-staff, such as the directors, managers
and marine superintendents, were interviewed and company docu-
ments studied. The second phase was conducted on-board ships involv-
ing four research voyages – two from each company – each lasting for a
period of around10days. A total of 55 sailing staff were interviewed and
documents such as inspection reports and internal correspondences
were studies and included. The interview data comprised of over
100 h of recording each lasting between 30 min and 2 h.
The purpose of data collection centred on identifying the regulatory
practices of PSC and oil majors and investigated the experiences of the
regulated in preparing for inspections, understanding the underlying
driving factors persuading them to do well in the inspections as well
as how inspections were conducted and results of these dealt with.
The inquiry limited itself to operational issues such as safety and pollu-
tion prevention each of which were the common areas for both regula-
tors assessed as the basis for emerging normative perspectives.
Questions included:
• Describe the practice of preparing for the different types of inspec-
tions on your ship
• Explainwhy youwould consider one type of inspectionmore effective
than the other
• Describe the role played by the shore-based managers in the context
of both inspections
Through semi-structured interviews the respondents were encour-
aged to elaborate and add their personal views and beliefs when
responding to the questions. The analysis involved transcribing and the-
matically examining transcripts and documents into nodes and catego-
ries. Links and patterns between the interviews and documents as well
as similarities and variances between the practices of the two types of
inspections were carefully examined and analysed (Howell, 2013).
We acknowledge that the data is primarily drawn from the perspec-
tive of the regulated. This in itself is not a weakness as it can be argued
that matters pertaining to workplace are best understood by the
workers. The relative importance of the two major types of inspection,
the nuanced differences in their preparations could only be determined
by developing understandings in the ﬁeld. Strauss and Whitﬁeld's
(1998) argued that understandings regarding the dynamics of the
workplace required natural settings to enable rich data (Piore, 1983).
Indeed, to enhance understanding further, future research would need
to add the perspectives of the inspectors from the PSC as well as the
oil majors.7. Findings: relative impacts of the two types of inspections
In this section we examine the impacts of the different types of in-
spections through an assessment of a range of managerial and seafarer
perspectives. We were clear about why the questions were asked and
utilized the knowledge of the sector and insider expertise of one of
the interviewers (an ex-Captain in the industry). The possibilities of ex-
aggerated claims by interviewees were closely monitored through the
interviewers identifying inconsistencies with key pieces of information.
Obviously, interviewees bring subjective tendencies to the research;
consequently, triangulation of questionswas undertaken and responses
continually critically analysed.
Managers and seafarers alike regarded the PSC inspection in Europe
as highly effective by using terms such as ‘efﬁcient’ and ‘very thorough’.
An example of this general conceptualisation was made explicit by a
ship's ofﬁcer who considered that:
PSC inspectors generally do their job very well. You can't have a
poorly run ship and not get caught by a PSC inspector for long.
Approximately one in four foreign ships docking at member state
ports are routinely inspected by PSC on the basis of the Paris MoU
(Paris, 2012). The ship selection process involve a range of criteria
such as ﬂag type and age as well as earlier results of earlier inspections
and safety records of both the ship and operating company.
The interviewees from both companies revealed that such inspec-
tions in Europe were typically conducted once every year and the pro-
cess of inspection took around three to six hours. All interviewees
indicated that PSC inspections were unannounced and subsequently
caused a degree of apprehension for the managers and seafarers.
Apprehensions or fears were rooted in the PSC's ability to detain
ships and potential damage to the reputation of individual ships as
well as the wider ﬂeet. By pointing to PSC's active publicity mechanism,
managers from both companies described how a single unfavourable
inspection could strain their relationswith other stakeholders including
insurance providers and charterers as well as attract additional inspec-
tions across the ﬂeet. For instance, one manager from the EuroCo said:
We don't knowwhen it is coming…wehave to assume that itmight
be in the next port and keep ourselves prepared.While theymay not be
asking for anything out of the normal if they ﬁnd a faultwe have to pay a
heavy price.
Corroboration of management concernswere located in the number
of communications sent to shipboard colleagues urging them to remain
prepared for negotiating PSC inspections. One such communication
read:
[PSC] detention of vessels has far reaching implications that go well
beyond the immediate inconvenience and delays associated with recti-
fying the defects and releasing the vessel. Effects include (a) vessel
targeting factor in PSC inspection; (b) serious State response; and
(c) most importantly, cessation of commercial use of vessels by oil
majors.
In practice both companies performed well with PSC inspections. As
one of the managers in WorldCo said:
We have never had a [PSC] detention; never… in most cases we get
two or three or four deﬁciencies. Nothinghappenswith small number of
easily rectiﬁable deﬁciencies. Life goes on.
Likewise, the chief engineer of one EuroCo ship said:
If you are clean [not pumping bilge overboard] and holding regular
emergency drills you have no fear from the PSCs even in Europe. The in-
spection only demands that we do our everyday tasks properly.
While the inspection in itself was not demanding anddid not require
any special preparation, a lapse on the day, usually associatedwith sub-
standard shipping, could lead to severe consequences. Thus the objec-
tive was to pass inspections and avoid negative attention. This was a
constant theme throughout the interviews; ‘preparation’ was a contin-
ual variable and underpinned local adherence to regulatory structures
and inspections.
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invitations from ship managers. The objective was to obtain approval
of the tanker ﬂeet (usually for a period of 12 months), so that they
could undertake trade with oil majors' cargo and receive an enhanced
hire value in return. But as there was around ten oil majors engaged
in maritime transportation, each ship in both companies underwent
an inspection every 2–3 months. Each such inspection usually lasted
the entire working day and was conducted during cargo unloading op-
erations while in the port. What was also of importance was that even
when an oil major did not hire a tanker directly, it was likely to have
some involvement along the supply chain link e.g. as the buyer of the
cargo or the terminal operatorwhere the ship docks or even as the seller
at the wholesale market. Such involvementmade oil major approval al-
most a prerequisitewhichprompted oneof themanagers to term the oil
majors as ‘omnipresent’.
Managers fromboth companies indicated that for economic viability
their primary aim was to ensure that all tankers in the ﬂeet had oil
major approval from as many oil major companies as possible. For ex-
ample a senior manager from EuroCo indicated that:
… anoilmajor inspection reportwas the outcomeof a thorough pro-
fessional inspection. To get their approval we have to be one of the best
in themarket – it worksmutually: they expect the best safety standards
whichwe offer by spending signiﬁcant resources while they give us the
best charter rate… in our weekly ofﬁce meeting we always discuss the
oil major approval status in the ﬂeet – the CEO is keen on that.
Managers were also quick to identify the demanding nature of such
inspections by explaining how each inspection required ‘weeks of prep-
aration’, was resource intensive and invariably demanded follow-up ac-
tions such as undertaking repair work, installing new hardware or even
making procedural changes to get the company's operating procedures.
This exempliﬁed an overwhelming a general perspective regarding the
powers associated with oil majors' in this context a WorldCo manager
identiﬁed his role in the process:
I usually attend one [oil major inspection on one of the ships in the
ﬂeet] every month. It is the norm. I ﬂy to the port and help the captain
prepare for the inspection. I have developed my own inspection check-
list … Then I need to follow it up in order to close the deﬁciencies. It is
one of the most stressful tasks. There is too much at stake.
Through triangulated questioning during interviews ships ofﬁcers
endorsed the views regarding the intense preparation associated with
oil major inspection. The captain of one EuroCo ship enumerated a
long list of logbooks that needed to be up-to-date and checks that had
to be carried out prior to such inspection and added:
We usually get a week to prepare and you can rest assured that
each minutest of mistakes would be found by the [oil major] inspec-
tors … one major or even too many minor observations lead to a
failed outcome. Each observation requires individual attention and
care.
Each of those interviewedwere explicit regarding the serious conse-
quences of failing an oil major inspection as this threatened the ship's li-
cense to carry oil major cargo and thus affected the business plan of the
company. Managers of both companies acknowledged performing
poorly and even failing in recent oil major inspections which resulted
in the incrimination and black-listing of both captains and the shore
manager responsible for the ships. Failing an inspection had repercus-
sions for the ship in question as well as approval for others in the
ﬂeet. Reﬂecting available documentation one EuroCo manager
explained:
One-year validity is… the maximum period, not the minimum. We
could be inspected several times by the same oil major in a year, for in-
stance before a new short-term contract or using a new terminal. We
are pretty much at their [oil majors'] mercy.
Throughmultiple interviews and documentation it was evident that
the thoroughness and high frequency of oil major inspections placed re-
lentless pressure on senior employees. One interviewee called it a ‘high
stake game’ as the resources in terms of investment and time werehighly demanding while the consequences of failing were serious. The
strength of the oil majors' regulatory mechanism came from the rigor-
ous standard they adopted and the high inspection frequency. Oil
major inspections kept managers and seafarers continuously ‘on their
toes’ and ensured they operated their ships at the highest standards be-
cause had far greater consequences than the PSC inspections.
A more direct comparison between the two sets of inspection re-
vealed how the standard of oil major inspections was seen as the ulti-
mate and all-encompassing. Given that the stakes were higher when
undergoing oil major inspections, a WorldCo manager pointed out:
If we pass this [an oil major inspection] we pass everything … all
other inspections including one by the PSC.
From a logical perspective similar views were made apparent by all
interviewees who had personally experienced the two types of inspec-
tions. One rating on a WorldCo ship, for instance, said:
From themanager down tomewe are always thinking of passing oil
majors … we don't talk of PSC that much.
Indeed archived results from PSC and oil major inspection in Europe
further corroborated this view. For example, there were several occa-
sions when the two different types of inspections were conducted on
the same ship within a short period of time and in every instance the
oil major inspection reports were far more detailed and scrupulous.
On oneparticular occasion oneof the EuroCo shipswas inspected simul-
taneously by PSC and oil major in the port of Rotterdam. Corroborating
the interview perspectives the two inspection reports were starkly dif-
ferent; the PSC inspector reported only four deﬁciencies, which were
part of a longer list of 20 deﬁciencies reported in detail by the oil
major inspector.
It is important to reﬂect on the responses from the interviewees
which appear to suggest that the oil major and PSC inspections
were the only drivers of operational safety and pollution prevention
in the two companies studied. As we pointed out earlier, it is not the
entire story because the industry beneﬁts from several layers of self-
regulation and much of that work goes on behind the scene and is
highly likely to be reﬂected in the outcome of these inspections.
But they do not get as much coverage especially from the perspective
of the regulated (those at the coalface) negotiating the PSC and oil
major inspections. However, we accept that it is possible that the in-
terviewees were excessively sensitive to these two forms of inspec-
tion because they were driven by fear of failing (especially those
conducted by the oil majors).
That said, while not discounting what may be considered subjective
tendencies emerging through the interviews, it is clear that when the
two forms of inspections are compared, there appears to be a distinc-
tion. The level of preparation demanded by oil majors, the rigour of
their inspection process and their impacts as perceived by the regulated
were so compelling that there was little room for PSC inspections to de-
mand anything that was not already taken into account. This was de-
spite the case that our chosen region of study was a leading example
of PSC effectiveness.
Oil majors involve tight regulations that are functional at an interna-
tional level. Unlike the PSC, the oil majors do not require an interconti-
nental dimension. The PSC is less stringent than the oil majors as the
latter carry high level economic sanctions for a speciﬁc element of the
shipping industry. In comparison to the PSC inspection, oil major regu-
lationwas considerably distinct and required a different level of compli-
ance although it regulated the same operational issues on ship's safety
and pollution prevention. Each involved aspects of functionalism with
a distinct normative dimension: oil majors international and PSC
inter-continental. Overall, the ﬁndings reveal that in a functionalist con-
text both PSC and oil majors had far-reaching impacts in inspecting and
controlling the maritime tanker industry.
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Overall we considered that the factors that underpin the effective
practice of the oil majors involved consistency in their inspections, sub-
sequent control processes and a high level of coordination among the oil
majors. The ﬁrst factor was largely drawn from the oil major's globally
coordinated operating procedure starting with strict systems of inspec-
tor selection, their training and regular updating of knowledge to inform
management of the process under the Ship Inspection Report Pro-
gramme (SIRE) structure, which allowed for little variation of standards
or individual inconsistency.
In this context one of the ofﬁcers on a WorldCo ship, for instance,
remarked:
The preparation effort for all oilmajors is the same; there is nodiffer-
ence between theoilmajors or even between the sameoilmajor inspec-
tions in two different ports'.
Likewise, one EuroCo manager explained:
The oil major inspection follows the SIRE system. The inspector al-
ways represents one particular oilmajor companybut that is of little rel-
evance as to which one it is.
The consistency in the oil majors' operating procedure made it
possible for the regulated to prepare for a standard that was high
but predictable. Such practice symbolises the effectiveness of
the functionalist mechanism and if we take into consideration
Mitrany's (1975a) it can be suggested that the main causal factor
for the effectiveness of the oil majors' regulatory initiative is because
it operated from the most appropriate functional level. Indeed, the
need for an inter-continental component was necessary but for this
to function correctly an international variable in the form of oil ma-
jors was required.
On the other hand, we considered that even though the PSC oper-
ated under a similar premise it was reliant on a continental dimension.
Lack of overarching control in inspector selection, training or consistent
operational practice in the inspection process compromised the poten-
tial beneﬁts of such a supranational effort. In addition, theywere limited
to the continental level (Europe) and state interference whereas the oil
majors were international. For those regulated the variation in the stan-
dard of inspection was readily evident. One of the EuroCo managers
with 20 years of experience in PSC inspection in Europe, for instance, in-
dicated that:
PSC inspections across Europe [where we trade] reﬂect individual
inspector's point of view. Mostly it is luck that matters … Some are so
erratic … if you hold two PSC inspections on the same ship at the
same time the reports will be very different ….
The use of state based mechanism by the individual nation states in
the European PSC system is inescapable as it was after all the precise ob-
jective to directly compensate for the failure of the original form of ﬂag-
state regulation. It has a historic relationship with the way in which the
regulation in the shipping industry has operated as a state-led initiative
but for the same reason the principles of international functionalism
cannot be fulﬁlled in this way.
The relative weakness of the PSC was evident despite decades of
maritime expertise of inspection and control mechanism and the infra-
structures of states, most of whichwere TMN. The rationale for such rel-
ative ineffectiveness is located in their lack of overarching control and
consistency over the regulatory system. The European level is more ef-
fective than state based regulation but not as comprehensive as the oil
majors international dimension which supports a functionalist argu-
ment. We observe both a continental an international based institution
and found that the PSC is unable to function at the international level
where the oil majors can. This goes back to the historical connection be-
tween a regulation and its territorial limits. In the case of Europe the
extra territoriality was achieved because of structural and institutional
changes, but in the current paradigm of regulation it could not be ex-
tended further. The maritime oil industry is built on the premise of in-
ternational trade with its footing ﬁrmly placed across the world. Thekey feature of such oil major's private governance by inspection and en-
forcement is territorially inconsequential.
Also important was the coordination in the inspections and control
by both the PSC and oil majors. A principle operating strategy in the
European PSC was rooted in high levels of coordination among the
member states in sharing of the data from inspections. Deﬁciencies
identiﬁed on a ship were thus shared among the member states such
that the ship could be monitored and if required further inspected
whenever it subsequently called another port in the region. The PSC in
Europe thus posits as a highly effective example of neo-functional regu-
latory practice.
A similar level of coordination was also emulated by the oil majors.
Sharing of data on inspection reports among the users of the SIRE
scheme was a core feature of the system. The knowledge about the in-
spection result thus does not stay conﬁned to between the ship and
the speciﬁc oil major. Onemanager described thewhole practice as ‘im-
penetrable’ and said:
We can't say that we would only have our ship inspected by Shell
and carry their cargo. It is not that Shell is easier than BP. They all are
of the same standard –we can't choose just one. They share reports be-
tween them – so if today one reports a defect the next onewould go on
board and inquire of the same defect [ﬁrst].
We have little evidence that reports are shared by oil majors but it
would be a logical position and one that interviewees considered realis-
tic. That said, the sharing of inspection reports among the oil majors can
appear counterintuitive because the number of ‘safe’ ships are not end-
less and hiring them is evidently good for the reputation of the oil ma-
jors. However, the oil majors did not consider that critical in their
business and converged under the SIRE system.
Grant and Marsh (1977) and Marsh (1978) provide an explanation
to the rationale for why companies competing in a common market
might refrain from direct competition in certain aspects. The authors
point out that there are beneﬁts for joining common interest groups
not only for services or selective incentives but for collective goods.
These could include political lobbying involving regulatory change af-
fecting the entire industry (Moe, 1980) or as has been identiﬁed by
(Bhattacharya and Tang, 2013) it is ecopolitics in the maritime tanker
sector that prompts the oil majors to join forces when monitoring and
enforcing regulation. The pollution of ‘ocean space’ brings disrepute to
the entire industry which potentially affects the oil trading community
andnot stay conﬁned just to the oilmajor in question. Awareness in sus-
tainability, ecopolitics and environmentalism has led to pressures from
the public and political implications beyond the immediate market. For
the oil majors, the rationale for complyingwith social and environmen-
tal regulations is thus more compelling than what could otherwise be
gained by competing against one another. This reiterates DeSombre's
(2008) point regarding the ‘club effect’ which already exists in the in-
dustry. Just as Protection and Indemnity (P&I) Clubs and Classiﬁcation
Societies ﬁnd mutual beneﬁt by sharing information and discouraging
destructive competition among the club members, the oil majors
share a similar philosophy.
9. Conclusion
This ethnographic constructivist study of international maritime
tanker industry provides compelling evidence of the relative effective-
ness of functionalism in both inter-continental and international con-
texts. Both forms of monitoring and enforcement of regulation in the
maritime tanker sector were initiated around the same time. The com-
mercially operated regulatory mechanism followed the international
principles of functionalism and operated independent of the state in-
struments while the implementation of PSC in European waters pro-
vided the basis for an inter-continental perspective. Each identiﬁed a
means of understanding the construction of ocean space that did not ne-
cessitate a totally ‘realist’ perspective. However, even though an inter-
national dimension exists, regulation is still determined through social
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industries. Consequently, a global regulator related to speciﬁc territory
had not emerged and this would not occur until different understand-
ings of international relationswere apparent. Ocean space involves a so-
cial construction and conceptualisation of this space is central to ‘the
institutions and structures that govern … lives’ (Steinberg, 2001;
p191). Space is still perceived through the prism of territory and regula-
tion of this space continues to be located in acceptable constructed
structures or discourses.
Both PSC and oil majors were inﬂuential in reversing regulatory de-
cline but originated from two different elements of the theoretical per-
spective. The former was imposed as a statutory requirement in Europe
and operated from the standpoint of a neo-functional perspective and
provided the basis for inter-continental aspects of functionalism.
While the latter was exerted by the powerful leaders of an exclusive
supply chain and acted within an international space. In general, the in-
terviewees considered the latter more effective. The PSC availed de-
cades of maritime expertise of the TMN and a high level of
coordination among the member states while the oil major led regula-
tion did not enjoy the same level of institutional maturity. Their regula-
tory practices excelled due to the effective and regular application of
inspection and control of existing regulation at an international rather
than regional level. Through each institution both aspects of functional-
ism are realised in the shipping industry in terms of intercontinental
and international levels. This is not the ﬁrst time that PSC has been de-
ﬁcient in addressing pollution concerns in the shipping industry.
Mitchell (1994) reveals the reluctance of the port states to impose puni-
tive measures often because of a lack of convincing evidence to make a
legal case. There was also a limit to how much resource state agencies
were able to investwhen identifying violating seafarers or ship-owners.
Finally, the study also suggests that functionalism in the context of
the shipping industry has undergone a metamorphosis in terms of nor-
mative underpinning; rather than identifying peace as the basis of non-
state regulatory initiative it is triggered by wider populist views on
green politics and environmental sustainability. This paper considers
that through the protection afforded the natural world (ocean space)
through functionalist agencies and regulation the idea has developed
an ethical perspective beyond its original remit of peaceful order and
the exploitation of the freedom of the seas for unfettered trade
(McGonigle and Zacher, 1979). The shift in the normative perspective
probably explains our increased consideration toward the environment
which is more pronounced than a more generalist ideal of peaceful co-
existence. Environmentalism is not new in the history of regulatory in-
ﬂuence in the tanker sector. Throughout the 1970s and 1980s the pres-
sures to address harmful environmental effects resulted in installing
expensive new equipment in the tanker sector. Building ships with
void chambers and separating cargo and ballast spaces in the oil tankers
were some of the products (Mitchell, 1994). Such impacts are less evi-
dent in other sectors of the maritime industry, such as in bulk or con-
tainer trade, arguably because they don't trade environmentally
sensitive cargoes.
While environmentalismmay act as the precondition for functional-
ist regulatory initiation, its effectiveness is scripted by the mechanisms
on which it relies. Through understanding the implementation of regu-
lation based on functionalismwe can identify the effectiveness of inter-
continental and international regulatory structures. As Mitrany noted,
Europe would not be able to deal with the international arena and re-
quired coordination with other states. However, in a globalized world
it is evident that we are not speaking of other states but an industry
led institution based on normative factors relating to environmentalism
and safety. Proﬁt provides the driver for effective regulation but a func-
tional international mechanism enables effective regulation for ship-
ping in one speciﬁc sector ‘oil’. Ocean space and mobilities are
constructed through normative considerations that rely on agencies be-
yond the nation-state and implementation of regulation through func-
tional variables.References
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